An Initial Investigation of Protocol Customization

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Today's protocols are feature-rich

- Widely-used protocols contain a rich set of features and extensions
 - Around 15 extensions for the functionality provided by the TLS protocol message formats
 - Different usage scenarios
 - TCP extensions
 - Performance consideration
 - Various HTTP/2 features
 - Implemented as a one-size-fits-all library





Vulnerabilities caused by unnecessary features

- Not all features are desirable in a particular deployment scenario, and unused features enlarge attack surface
 - HeartBleed attack caused by an implementation flaw in TLS/DTLS heartbeat extension
 - Optional in many deployment scenarios



- FREAK attack exploiting weak RSA_EXPORT cipher suites
 - Stronger cipher suites already available



Protocol Customization

- Modify and specialize a standard protocol to enable only desirable features
- Compile-time disabling
 97 OpenSSL_NO* compiler flags
 - OpenSSL
- Runtime disabling or parameter tuning
 - mod_* parameters for module disabling



Existing customization practices

- Existing customization practices are ad-hoc
 - Often relying on configurations offered by the protocol implementation
- Case study
 - Per-feature disabling on HTTP/2 features is not supported in Apache HTTP server
 - HPACK bomb vulnerability (CVE-2016-1544, CVE-2016-6581)
 - Developer failed to cover this customization option



Systematic way of protocol customization is needed

- Call for a *systematic* approach to overcome existing limitations
 - Minimizing human efforts and errors
 - Covering customization on important features
 - Supporting customization of fine-grained features
- Question: can we systematically customize a standard protocol to reduce its attack surface with sufficient automation?

Solution direction

- Protocol feature access control
 - A systematic framework to unify common protocol customization practices



- Access control resource: protocol feature
- Two types of access control policy
 - Feature disabling policy
 - Feature tuning policy
- Validation: 17 out of 20 CVE patches can be expressed by feature disabling or tuning policy

Access control example: HeartBeat

To prevent HeartBleed vulnerability



Research challenges

- How to systematically identify features and locate its code-level implementation
 - Bridging the gap between user-level and codelevel features
 - Natural language processing
 - Deep neural networks



- Systematically locating code-level featurerelated implementation
 - Control and data flow analysis



Research challenges

- How to effectively support diverse types of protocol customization with minimized manual efforts
 - Enforcing policies without assuming that the code base structure is ready for customization by design
 - Control and data flow analysis
 - Supporting feature disabling and tuning policy
 - Control and data flow analysis
 - Symbolic execution



Preliminary system design

Input: features to be customized, protocol software



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Limitation

- Protocol customization alone is insufficient in addressing some vulnerability cases
 - Vulnerability related to core functionality that requires significant change to the details of a protocol feature
 - TLS vulnerability caused by the weakness in key generation

Summary

Perform an initial investigation of protocol customization for reducing attack surface of a standard protocol

- Identify key research challenges for systematic and sufficiently automated protocol customization
- Propose an access control mechanism to unify existing protocol customization practices

Future work

- Feature identification using NLP techniques
- Feature access control: more detailed design and impl.

Thank you!

• Questions?